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1. Introduction 
Since early 1996, Japan's Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) has been 
actively implementing" a comprehensive and drastic deregulation package" concerning the 
Japanese telecommunications industry I) . One important item on the regulatory reform 
agenda is to relax rate regulations and introduce incentive regulations such as a price-cap 
system and yardstick system. Is this a desirable move in the context of improving economic 
efficiency? Will the new regulatory mechanisms make the regulated firms competitive? 
What will this prospective regulatory move do to the Japanese telecommunications 
industry? Although there are many theoretical justifications for this sort of regulatory 
reforms, these questions are extremely difficult to answer ex ante given the complexity of 
this fast-growing industry with its drastic technological progress as well as lack of relevant 
data concerning Japanese telecommunications. Fortunately, Japan can look to other 
countries such as the UK and the US which have been at the forefront of regulatory reforms 
for clues, prospects, and policy implications in this respect. I attempt to provide some clues 
to the questions raised above by evaluating the effects of recent regulatory reforms on the 
local exchange carriers in the US telephone industry. It is my hope that the findings here 
shed light on the prospective regulatory reforms in Japan's telecommunications industry 
and their potential outcomes. 
This article is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief literature review. Section 3 
provides background information on the various regimes used by state public utilities 
commissions regulating local exchange carriers. A theoretical framework is presented in 
Section 4. Section 5 lays out an empirical model. Section 6 discusses the data, and the 
empirical results are discussed in section 7. Section 8 provides concluding remarks about 
policy implications of the findings and limitations of the current work. 
1 ) See Outline of the Telecommunications Business in Japan (August 1997) by Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications. 
0Aomori Public College 
2. Literature Review-Pros and Cons of Regulatory Regimes 
Telecommunications regulation has been an enduring issue to economic theorists and 
regulators. The past two decades have witnessed unprecedented research in this area with a 
rich literature on regulating the telecommunications industry. Most previous works have 
focused on theorizing about the effectiveness of regulatory mechanisms in achieving 
economic efficiency. The resulting policy implications have led to a variety of regulatory 
innovations which aim presumably to achieve greater economic efficiency and more 
competition. For decades US regulators have used rate-of-return (ROR) regulation to set 
price levels for telephone service providers. As early as the 60s, economists became aware 
of potential problems with ROR regulation. One well-known problem is excessive capital 
investment (Averch and Johnson, 1962), i.e., firms subject to rate-of-return regulation do 
not equate marginal product of a factor to the marginal cost of the factor, thereby operating 
inefficiently without minimizing cost at the output it selects. Further problems with ROR 
regulation are that regulated firms have incentives to cross-subsidize their unregulated 
products by shifting the costs to the regulated products, or underproduce in competitive 
markets (Braeutigam and Panzar, 1989). By analyzing the effects of ROR regulation on the 
choice of output level, choice of technology, incentive for cost-reducing innovations, 
vertical integration, and pricing below marginal costs, Braeutigam and Panzar conclude 
that a profit-maximizing firm operating under ROR regulation is Pareto inefficient in the 
sense that regulated firms underproduce in unregulated markets, may choose an inefficient 
level of common facilities used in producing both regulated and unregulated outputs, and 
their levels of innovative effort will generally not be efficient. Rate-of-return regulation is 
criticized for being costly to administer, not providing consistent incentives to cost 
efficiency, and possibly encouraging cross-subsidization. 
Other economists, however, believe that traditional ROR regulation has its merit. One 
argument is that with the ROR regime a regulatory agency actually "sets the prices of 
services and not rates of return. Once the prices for utility services are set by the regulatory 
authority, they remain at fixed levels until they are officially increased or decreased by 
action of the regulatory authority (Joskow, 1973)." This implies that ROR regulation 
allows regulators "in a relatively simple manner, to limit monopoly pricing through a close 
monitoring of the firm's profits (Liston, 1993)." Baumol and Klevorick (1971) point out 
that Averch-Johnson (A-J) effects tend to occur only when rate hearings are close. Kahn 
(1988) even suggests that excessive rate of return brought about by "the inevitable delay 
that regulation imposes in the downward adjustment of rate levels .... is to be regarded as a 
positive advantage." Johnson points out that ROR regulation works best when it works 
imperfectly (1989). 
To overcome the perceived problems of productive inefficiency, deficient innovation, 
cross-subsidization, and misallocation of resources associated with ROR regulation, 
economists have proposed alternative incentive regulatory regimes, among which price-cap 
(PC) regulation is most notable. Vogelsang and Finsinger (1979) show that a price-cap 
constrained welfare maximization algorithm provides an operational incentive mechanism 
for regulated multiproduct monopolies to charge economically efficient prices. Sibley 
(1989) shows also that under PC regulation firms have incentives to implement the socially 
optimal level of investment. Therefore, "[d]ivorcing price from cost can preserve a 
regulated firm's incentives to innovate and minimize costs and eliminate the incentive to 
cross-subsidize (Brennan, 1989)." 
Despite the extensive theoretical and normative discussions on the effectiveness of 
different regulatory regimes in achieving economic efficiency as well as recent regulatory 
innovations, there has not been much empirical research in this area. One of the few studies 
is done by Mathios and Rogers' (1989), who evaluate the impact of alternative regulatory 
regimes on AT&T's telephone rates. They find that rates tend to be lower where pricing 
flexibility is allowed. Another empirical analysis by Greenstein, McMaster and Spiller 
(1995) focuses on the effect of incentive regulation on telephone companies' development 
of digital infrastructure and identifies how different regulatory environments have 
influenced the recent historical pattern of investment in modern infrastructure equipment. 
They find that i) incentive regulation policies influence the level of deployment of modern 
equipment at the local exchange level in a manner consistent with economic theory; ii) 
more liberal regulatory environments lead to greater incentives to deploy modern 
equipment; iii) price regulation is a more potent regulatory mechanism than the standard 
earnings sharing scheme; iv) when associated with an earnings sharing scheme, price 
regulation is less effective in triggering infrastructure deployment than when it is 
implemented by itself. In assessing the impact of increasing competition on allocative 
efficiency of pre-divestiture local exchange markets, Oum and Zhang (1995) find evidence 
that ROR regulation suffers from A-J effects. They also find that A-J effects tend to 
decrease as competition intensifies. These empirical studies provide some important 
evidence on the performance of alternative regulatory regimes. However, none of these 
studies look into the effects of recent regulatory innovations on technical and allocative 
efficiencies of the local exchange carriers (LECs) which have long been the foundation of 
telecommunications in the US. This article is one attempt to explore such effects. 
3. Background 
Although economists do not agree on the pros and cons of different regulatory regimes2) 
, a variety of alternative incentive regulation plans concerning local exchange carriers have 
been adopted, enacted or elected, or are pending with state public utilities commissions in 
the US]). As of 1994, alternative regulatory plans were adopted in 30 states. Those 
alternative regimes are diverse and differ in I) the effective length, 2) the sharing 
parameters and mechanism, 3) the effective sharing frequency, 4) service quality criteria, 5) 
local service pricing restriction, 6) pricing flexibility of other products, 7) network 
modernization requirement, and 8) exogenous factor treatment (e.g., contingency 
provisions). For instance, the state of Alabama which uses rate-of-return regulation with a 
"earnings sharing plan" requires telephone companies to share up to 50% in excess of 
11.925% return on capital (ROC) if earnings are above 12.3% ROC, and minimum service 
standards and cost efficiency requirements are met. If earnings of a company fall below 
11.65% ROC, the company receives between 50% and 100% of the amount needed to 
return to 11.925% ROC. This regime took effect in 1989 and has been extended 
indefinitely beyond 1993. Cost efficiency is measured by comparing the actual annual cost 
per average access line to what the cost would have been had cost increases equaled CPI-
Wage increases. Earnings sharing is determined quarterly in accordance with the service 
quality measurements. Disposition of the customers' share is implemented through rate 
increases or decreases in a set of predetermined services. 
Despite their diverse and fluid forms, the alternative regimes concerning LECs at the 
state level generally fall into four categories: 1) rate-of-return regulation with earnings 
sharing; 2) price-cap regulation (with sharing overlay); 3) price-cap regulation (without 
sharing overlay); and 4) social contract and other incentives. Current regulatory reforms 
seem to be moving from earnings sharing to price regulation. As of 1994, 12 of the 50 
states have adopted some version of price regulation plans and ten states had pending price 
regulation plans. At the federal level, the FCC adopted a price cap plan for the LECs in 
2 ) Those demonstrated theoretical advantages of PC regulation are not always convincing. Lewis and 
Sappington [1989], for example, construct some simple regulatory settings and examine potential 
optimal regulatory policies in these settings. They show that PC regulation may be an ideal regulatory 
mechanism under some circumstances, but may not always be so. They conclude that 1) one form of 
PC regulation emerges endogenously as a component of the optimal regulatory policy; 2) what 
regulatory policy is optimal depends on the characteristics of a particular industry, which include firms' 
cost-reducing efforts, technological conditions, etc. In examining what constitutes good regulatory 
regimes, Schmalensee [1989] shows that price-caps tend to have better performance in the absence of 
cost uncertainty while ROR regulation generally performs better in the presence of cost uncertainty and 
asymmetric information about the capabilities of regulated firms. 
3 ) See Bell South [1993] "Regulatory Reform: A Nationwide Summary." 
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1990 which took effect on January 1, 1991, and numerous regulatory changes have been 
made ever since. 
4. Theoretical Framework 
Following Atkinson and Halvorsen (1986), I assume that a regulated firm's production 
decision is based on its managers' utility-maximizing behavior. Specifically, managerial 
utility function is given by 
U=U(7r, X) (1) 
where 7r is profit, X a vector of inputs, and U(.) a twice differentiable concave 
function4). I assume that 8U/87r>O ,and 8U/8xi is not known a priori. It may be positive 
or negative depending on the specific input. 
For a regulated firm, its utility-maximization problem subject to the profit and regulatory 
constraints can be written as 
L = U(7r,X)-.A[7r-Pj(X)+W'X] -cpR(X) (2) 
where j(X) is a production function, P price of output, Wa vector of factor prices, R(X) 
regulatory constraints; .A and cp are the Lagrange multipliers for profit and regulatory 
constraints respectivelyS). Since 8U/8n=.A the first-order condition for the ith input is 
given by 
p8j(X) _ ._ 8U/8Xi-cp8R/8Xi 
8X i - W z 8U/8n ' i = 1, ... ,no (3) 
Note that the left-hand side of Eg. (3) is the marginal revenue product of the ith input. The 
right-hand side can be interpreted as the shadow price of the ith input factor. According to 
4 ) See Atkinson and Halvorsen (1986) for the justification of this utility-maximization approach. 
5) For a firm subject to rate-of-return regulation, R (X) can be 
Pf(X) - WX::; (Wk - Wk)Xk 
where Wk is the regulated rate of return, W the firm's cost of capital, and Xk capital input. Most 
other regulatory regimes discussed in this article bear certain resemblance with rate-of-return regulation 
except one version of price- cap regulation. Specific functional forms of those regulatory constraints 
would not alter the model. With a typical price-cap regime, regulatory constraint is not a function 
of factors of production and the effect of the constraint would not enter the first-order 
conditions. Therefore, without loss of generality, the regulatory constraint is presented in this form for 
notational convenience. 
Eq. (3), for a utility-maximizing firm, the marginal revenue product of an factor is equal to 
its shadow cost which differs from its actual market cost. In the context of ROR regulation, 
Eq. (3) is an expression of the well-known A-J effects. Note also that, as implied by Eq. 
(3), the utility-maximization problem can be modeled as cost-minimization subject to 
properly defined shadow prices of factor inputs. Although the sign of the numerator of the 
second term on the right-hand side of Eq. (3) is ambiguous with the current setup, it is 
apparent that as marginal utility of profit 8Ujfhr increases, the gap between the actual 
market price of an input and its marginal revenue product gets smaller. 
Note that dividing the marginal revenue product of the ith input by that of the j th yield 
the following equality: 
8!(X)/8Xi 
8!(X)/8Xj 
Wp 
W~ 
J 
(4) 
where Wp and WiS are the shadow prices of the ith and jth inputs respectively. Eq. (4) 
says that, for a regulated utility-maximizing firm, the marginal rate of technical substitution 
between the ith and the jth inputs is equal to the ratio of their respective shadow prices. It 
follows that utility-maximization under regulation can be modeled as cost-minimization 
subject to a set of appropriately defined shadow prices of inputs. Based on Eq. (4), one can 
determine whether a firm's factor inputs are allocatively efficient by checking if Wp= Wi 
If, for instance, Wp < Wi while, W/= Wj the firm uses more the ith input than it needs 
to achieve an allocatively efficient outcome. Using this result, I build an empirical model to 
evaluate whether recent regulatory innovations improve allocative efficiencies of LEes. 
5. Empirical Framework 
As indicated in the last section, utility-maximization under regulation can be modeled as 
cost-minimization problem with appropriately defined shadow prices of inputs. Therefore, 
the minimum shadow cost function of the local exchange carriers can be written as: 
CS = C(WS , Y, Z, T), (5) 
where W S is a vector of shadow factor prices, Y a vector of outputs, Z a vector of 
operating characteristics, and T a set of annual dummies to proxy the unobserved 
technological change. This shadow cost function can be approximated in the following 
translog functional form: 
97 
lnCs = ao + L:f3i1nWP + L:/'dnYj + L:JklnZk + L:TmTm 
i j k m 
1 S S 1 1 
+ -2 L:L:BiklnWi lnWk + - L:L:LjllnYjlnYz + - L:L:"'kllnZklnZl 
ik 2jl 2kl 
+ L:L:AijlnwPlnYj + L:L:J.LiklnWplnZk + L:L:vjklnYjlnZk 
i j i k j k 
+ L:L:PmilnWPTm + L:L:wmjlnYjTm + L:L:wmklnZkTm 
m i m j m k (6) 
Applying Shephard's Lemma yields the following shadow factor share functions 6 ): 
for i = 1,2, ... ,n 
(7) 
Following Atkinson and Halvorsen, and Qum and Zhang, I model the shadow price for the 
ith input as Wp= hi Wi ,where O<hi~1 and hi is a proportionality factor measuring the 
deviation of the shadow price from the market price. Note that hi=1 implies equality 
between the shadow and actual prices of the ith input. If hi<1 while hj=1 then for the 
firm in question, its shadow price for the ith input is less than its market price, implying 
that it overuses the ith input. 
With a given shadow cost function and properly defined shadow prices of inputs, the 
actual cost function can be written as 
C A = W'X = W,8C
S 
= W' 8C
s 
8Ws 8(h'VV) (8) 
where 8C.5j8Ws is a vector of partial derivatives of the shadow cost with respect to all the 
shadow prices of inputs respectively, and h is a vector of factors of proportionality 
conformable to the vector of the market prices of inputs. The translog form of the actual 
cost function can be written as 
6) Lau and Yotopolous (1971) showed that Shephard's Lemma can be applied to deriving input demand 
8Gs 
functions from the shadow cost function, i.e., aWs =XP 
z 
lnCA = ao + LfJiIn(hiWi) + LrjInYj + L6klnZk + LTmTm 
i j k m 
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+ - LLBikIn(hi Wi)ln(hk Wk) + - LLtjllnYjlnYz + - LL~klZklnZl 2ik 2jl 2kl 
+ LLAijIn(hi Wi)lnYj + LLfLikIn(hi WdlnZk + LLVjklnYjlnZk (9) 
i j i k j k 
+ LLPmilnWtTrn + LLWmjInYjTm + LLWmkInZkTrn 
mi rnj mk 
+ In [2;h i1 (fJi + LBikIn(hk Wk) + 2;:AijInYj + LfLikInZk + LPmiTm)] 
z k J k m , 
and the corresponding actual cost shares can be written as 
for i,j=1,2, ... ,n. 
(10) 
Note that hi is likely to vary under different regulatory regimes (which is to be tested). To 
distinguish these in the empirical implementation, I denote hi as hin . The factors of 
proportionality are empirically defined as follows: 
hin = riO + LrinRn, 
n 
n = 1,2, ... ,N, (11 ) 
where Rn is a set of dummy variables representing N alternative regulatory regimes, riO 
is a parameter for the benchmark regulatory regime, and rin are parameters for alternative 
regimes. The benchmark regulatory regime is ROR regulation. Its proportionality factor is 
denoted as riO in Eq. (II) and is normalized to unity. Hence, rin measures the deviation of 
the proportionality factor of the i th input under the nth regulatory regime from under the 
ROR regime. Allocative efficiency requires that hin = hjn (for all i and j), i.e., the 
factor of proportion for the ith input being equal to that for the jth input. Since potential 
technological heterogeneity may be present in LECs' cost function, which could confound 
the behavioral differences of LECs, and different regulatory regimes may affect firms' 
technical efficiencies, I allow for these potential differences by nesting regulatory dummy 
variables with the constant and the linear terms of the shadow cost function as follows: 
ao = ao + LanRn, 
n 
rj = CjO + LCjnRn, 
n 
fJi = biO + LbinRn, 
n (12) 
6k = dkO + LdknRn, n= 1, ... ,N, 
n 
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where those parameters subscripted with 0 are for the benchmark regime ROR. Again, 
parameters for other regulatory regimes are simply the deviations from ROR regime. 
As usual, symmetry and homogeneity of factor price restrictions are imposed. The cost 
function and share equations are jointly estimated by dropping the material share equation 
from the system to avoid singularity. The estimation is invariant to the arbitrarily excluded 
share equation. All variables except the annual and regulatory dummies are normalized by 
their respective means. 
6. Data and Variables 
The data used in this article are Statistics of Communications Common Carriers (SOCC) 
and Regulatory Reform - A Nationwide Summary (RRNS). SOCC is an annual 
publication by the Federal Communications Commission on local exchange carriers' 
balance sheets and operating statistics. RRNS is a series of publications by BellSouth 
which provide detailed state-level information on the regulatory development concerning 
local exchange carriers. In the preliminary data set there is an unbalanced panel of 421 
LECs over a seven-year period (1988-1995). Since each state has its own regulatory 
regime and someLECs operate in more than one state, there is no one-to-one 
correspondence from the regulatory space to the cost space for LECs with multistate 
operating territories. To avoid this problem, I use a subset of the available data. LECs with 
multistate operating territories are omitted. As a result, there are 244 observations (38 
LECs) used in the estimation. Additional data is obtained from The National Income and 
Product Accounts and Moody's Public Utility Manual for computing the real capital stock. 
The dependent variables are total cost C, labor share SL, and capital share SK. The 
regressors include three exogenous factor price variables (i.e., labor, capital and materials), 
two output variables (i.e., total number of access lines and total number of calls), and three 
variables representing operating characteristics. To compute total cost, I subtract 
depreciation and amortization expenses from the total operating expenses, and then add the 
result to capital expenses. Total operating expenses include plant specific operation 
expenses, plant non-specific operations expenses, other operation related expenses and 
employee compensation 7) . 
Labor price PL is computed by taking the ratio of total employment compensation to the 
total number of employees. Capital price PK is obtained by dividing capital expenses with 
total number of access lines. Price of materials PM is obtained as the residual expenses 
7) Definitions of the cost and other variables largely mirror Shin and Ying (1992), and Wilson and Zhou 
(1997). 
divided by total number of access lines. I use total access lines YAC as one of the output 
variables~n. The second output variable is usage. Following previous research, I first 
specified the model with two separate usage variables (i.e., local output and long-distance 
output). The results emanating from this treatment and variations of this treatment are 
disappointing. In some specifications, for example, I observe small and statistically 
significant negative estimates on the linear term for long-distance calls, suggesting that at 
mean values, increases in the percentage of long-distance calls decreases costs. In other 
specifications, I observe small positive but statistically insignificant estimates. On 
inspection, I observed considerable multicollinearity in the data pertaining to these outputs. 
A quick (but not necessarily good) fix to this problem is to define an aggregate usage 
variable Yu by combining local and long-distance phone callsl)). The variables for 
operating characteristics are I) ratio of percentage of electronic switching equipment assets 
to total central office switching assets to represent the effects of observed technological 
change (denoted by E)IO), 2) number of central offices (denoted by CO), and 3) average 
loop length (denoted by AL). 
I include four regulatory dummy variables to represent existing regulatory regimes in the 
local exchange markets. During the sample period a variety of regulatory mechanisms were 
invented in the US telephone markets to replace the traditional rate-of-return regulation. As 
mentioned in section 3, the new regulatory regimes generally fall into four categories: I) 
rate-of-return with earnings sharing (ROROS), 2) price-cap with sharing overlay (PCSO), 
3) price-cap without sharing overlay (PC), and 4) social contract and other incentive 
schemes (SCOI). The regulatory dummy variables used in this article correspond to these 
categories II). Again, ROR regulation is used as the base regulatory regime. 
8) Wilson and Zhou (1997) point out that whether treatment of access lines as a fixed input or as an 
output is largely a matter of interpretation. Duncan (1990) and Taylor (1993) discuss output 
measurement in this industry in some detail. 
9) I also experiment with a product mix variable defined as PM=LC/(LC+TC), where PMis an index of 
product mix, LC the number of local calls, and TC the number of long-distance toll calls. Parameter 
estimates resulting from this specification are very similar to those from the specification reported in this 
article. 
10) An alternative which has been used is the ratio of electronic access lines to total access lines. These 
data, however, are not available during the sample period. Since electronic access lines are connected 
to electronic switches the two measures are likely highly correlated and our measure should yield 
results similar to those using the other measure. I also experimented with other measures e.g., the 
percentage of deployed fiber-optic cables to total cables. The resulting estimate for unobserved 
technological changes is not significant. 
11) These acronyms will be used in referring to the regulatory regimes hereafter. However, when reporting 
the statistical results, I use their corresponding numerical codes in referring to these regimes. 
]()] 
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7. Empirical Results 
I estimate an "unrestricted" system of equations given by Eqs. (9) and (l0), using 
Zellner's iterative seemingly-unrelated-regression method 12). A linear error term is 
attached to each equation. I normalize the factor of proportionality of labor input h L to 
unity, i.e., rLo=l ,and rLn=O for all n=l, ... , 4, where n indexes the four alternative 
regulatory regimes. Parameter estimates are provided in table 1 and table 2. In general, the 
model fits the data and satisfies the regularity conditions. R 2 S for the estimated cost, labor 
share, and capital share functions are 0.9961, 0.2923, and 0.6598 respectively. The 
estimated cost and share functions are all positive. The estimated cost function at its mean 
value is concave in factor prices, and for the most part monotonic in outputs. The estimated 
marginal cost of access lines are positive for .all 244 observations, and 218 out of 244 
observations (i.e., about 90 percent of the observations) have positive estimated marginal 
cost of usage output. Most first-order terms have the expected signs and are statistically 
significant. 
Parameters related to the constant term are all significant except the one for PCSO 
regime. The negative parameters for ROROS, PC, and SCOI indicate that LECs under 
these alternative regulatory regimes tend to be more technically efficient than those under 
ROR. The log likelihood ratio test is performed to test the null hypothesis that all LECs 
under alternative regulatory regimes have equal technical efficiencies which do not differ 
from that of LECs under ROR regulation, i.e., al =a2=a3=a4=0 This hypothesis is 
rejected. (See table 3.) This suggests that LECs subject to alternative regulatory constraints 
(except for PCSO) operate on lower cost curves. 
The estimated mean values of labor and capital shares are respectively 0.2857 and 0.3693 
for LECs under ROR regime. The mean values for all observations in the sample are 
0.2762 and 0.3754. The negative parameter estimates related to the capital input and the 
positive parameters related to the materials input under alternative regimes suggest that 
LECs tend to have smaller capital shares and greater materials shares under these 
alternative regimes. These differences reflect the heterogeneity in the production 
technologies of the LECs. Log likelihood ratio tests are performed to determine whether 
LESs' production technologies differ with regulatory constraints. I test these potential 
differences first for each factor and then jointly for all factors. Specifically, the nulls are 
that 1) bKl =bK2 =bK3 =bK4=0 , 2) bMl =bM2=bM3=bM4 =0 , and 3) all these eight 
parameters are jointly zero. All the null hypotheses are rejected (see table 3). 
12) It is unrestricted in the sense that it is a standard translog specification with all the linear and second-
order terms. However, the homogeneity of factor prices and symmetry conditions are imposed. 
Necessary normalizations are also made. 
As for the output variables, the parameter estimates of the first-order term are 
respectively 0.88 for access lines and 0.07 for usage under ROR regime. These estimates 
are consistent with previous findings about the industry. Although four out of eight output-
related parameters are not significant for alternative regimes, the null hypotheses that they 
are jointly zero are rejected (i.e., CKl =CK2=CK3=CK4=0 and CMl =CM2=CM3=CM4=0 ). 
The first-order parameter estimates for operating characteristics variables also have the 
expected signs for the benchmark regime 13 ). Many parameters for alternative regimes are 
insignificant. Results of log likelihood ratio tests indicate that null hypotheses concerning 
output and the number of central offices are rejected at 0.5 percent level whereas those 
related to electronic access switches and average loop length can not be rejected (see table 
3). Therefore, there may not be "regime-specific" effects in these areas. 
The focal point of this article concerns allocative efficiency of LECs under alternative 
regulatory regimes. As previously mentioned, ROR regime is used as the benchmark and 
the factors of proportionality for capital and materials are normalized to unity for this 
regime. Consequently, testing allocative efficiency entails testing the following sets of 
hypotheses for LECs under alternative regulatory regimes: 
rKl =0, rK2=0, rK2=0, rK4=0, rMl =0, rM2=0, rM2=0, rM4=0, 
rKl =rK2 =rK3=rK4=0 rMl =rM2=rM3=rM4=0; (13) 
where n = 1, ... , 4. One can determine whether the null hypotheses involving the first 
group of parameters given in Eq. (13) by computing the t-statistics from the parameter 
estimates and their respective standard errors. (See table 1 for details.) The second group of 
parameters in Eq. (13) requires joint tests. 
Note that rKO +rKn and rMO +rMn are factors of proportionality which capture the 
relationship between shadow prices and actual prices of inputs under the nth regulatory 
regime. The parameter estimates indicate that, compared with the benchmark of ROR 
regime, shadow prices of capital tend to be higher whereas those of materials tend to be 
lower under ROROS. Shadow prices of capital also tend to be higher under PCSO while 
those of materials do not significantly differ from the benchmark. Under both PC and 
SCOI, shadow prices of both capital and materials tend to be lower than their respective 
13) The only exception though is the benchmark parameter for average loop length. This parameter, which 
is expected to be positive, turns out to be negative. This may have resulted from not controlling for the 
firm-specific effects in estimating the model. Wilson and Zhou (1997) points out the importance of 
controlling for these effects in estimating LECs' cost function. However, the required large number of 
parameters prevents me from implementing a similar methodology. The same explanation may also be 
applied to the large magnitude of the parameter estimate for the technological variable. Consequently, 
these parameter estimates may be biased and should be interpreted with caution. 
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benchmarks. (See table 1.) Assuming that ROR regime causes misallocation of resources 
(i.e., Averch-Johnson effect) 14), it is tempting to conclude that these statistics indicate 
alleviation of the over-capitalization problem under ROROS and peso regimes. 
However, higher shadow prices of capital under ROROS and peso do not necessarily 
imply that allocative efficiency is improved under ROROS and peso, for allocative 
efficiency requires the equality between the factor of proportionality for the ith input and 
that for the jth, i.e., hi=hj , or rKn=rMn in the present context. The log likelihood ratio 
tests of the hypotheses indicate that the null hypotheses that rKn=rMn can not be accepted 
for ROROS and peso (see table 4). This implies that allocative efficiency is not achieved 
under ROROS and peso regimes. 
Due to normalizations, the empirical model does not yield parameter estimates of factors 
of proportionality for the ROR regime. To further investigate whether factors of 
proportionality differ from unity under ROR benchmark, I experiment with a few sets of 
arbitrary restrictions based on the theoretical prediction by Averch and Johnson, and 
empirical findings of Oum and Zhang (1995). Specifically, I impose restrictions so that 
rKo<l and rMO<l . The results of log likelihood tests are provided in table 5. All of 
these null hypotheses are rejected. The statistics in table 5 seem to have a notable pattern, 
i.e., the more they deviate from one, the greater X2 Statistics. 
These statistics suggest that LEes under the traditional ROR regime may not suffer from 
allocative inefficiency, at least not those in the sample. Although this finding does not 
support the allocative inefficiency argument against ROR regulation and differs somewhat 
from empirical evidence found by Oum and Zhang, the statistics are plausible. One 
possible explanation is that rapid technological progress in both telecommunications and 
some upstream industries such as computer hardware and software industries have 
drastically reduced the actual cost of capital during the past decade. Reduction of the actual 
market cost of capital may have narrowed the gap between the shadow and market prices 
of capital, thus alleviating or even eradicating the perverse incentives of firms to over-
capitalize under the ROR regime. Another possible explanation is that LEes have been 
exposed to ever-growing competitive pressure from wireless and other means of 
telecommunications for their customers, which forces LEes under ROR to behave in an 
allocatively efficient manner. Indeed, Oum and Zhang have found evidence that 
competition helped the US telephone companies improve allocative efficiency in the late 
80s. 
To sum up, the empirical model yields some interesting results. First, recent regulatory 
innovations concerning LEes may be responsible for improving technical efficiency. 
14) Oum and Zhang (1995) find evidence of resource misallocation in the US telephone industry between 
1972 and 1990 under ROR. They also find that competition tend to alleviate the problem. 
Second, ROR regime is not found to suffer from allocative inefficiency. Third (given the 
second finding), alternative regimes do not seem to yield any positive results in improving 
allocative efficiency. What policy implications can be derived from these findings? At the 
risk of being indiscreet, I would venture the following conclusion: Recent regulatory 
innovations concerning local exchange carriers in the US telecommunications industry may 
have fixed some problems found in the old ROR regime but also have created new ones. 
Although the benefit mayor may not outweigh the cost from alternative regimes, one can 
legitimately assert that regulation is not the first-best policy choice in this dynamic 
telecommunications industry. Considering the additional cost of instituting and 
administering regulations as well as the rapid technological progress that is being made in 
telecommunications, the society as a whole may be much better off if the industry is 
completely deregulated. In the context of the on-going "comprehensive and drastic 
deregulation package" in Japan, a few words of caution seem to be warranted: Replacing 
old regulatory regimes with new regimes is not synonymous with deregulation. Given the 
dynamics in telecommunications, leaving this industry to market forces is likely to yield an 
economically and socially more desirable outcome than any intricately designed regulatory 
regime can achieve. 
8. Concluding Remarks 
The objective of this article is to examine the effects of recent regulatory reforms on the 
local exchange carriers in the US telephone industry and thereby demonstrate the likely 
outcome of regulatory reforms for Japan's telecommunications industry. By using the most 
recent data available and estimating a cost function for LECs, I find that recent regulatory 
innovations may not have yielded the desired effects of improving allocative efficiencies. 
On the contrary, LECs under the traditional ROR regime appear to operate in an 
allocatively efficient manner. A logical question arising from this finding is: If LECs 
subject to the ROR regulatory constraint act in an allocatively efficient manner, how would 
they respond to alternative regulatory regimes? The results of hypothesis testing provide 
important empirical clues to the question, i.e., LECs subject to alternative regulatory 
constraints do not appear to be more allocatively efficient. In fact, if LECs under ROR are, 
as my test results suggest, allocatively efficient in their operations, then any regulatory 
attempt to alter the existing regime is likely to cause more harm than good. 
However, cautions should be exercised in interpreting these findings. The statistics 
hereof do not - nor are they intended to - constitute a vindication of the traditional ROR 
regime nor a condemnation of alternative regulatory regimes in general. One can not infer 
that allocative efficiency is intrinsic to the traditional ROR regime or extend the findings to 
other regulated industries. In other industries, firms under ROR regime may well be found 
J()5 
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allocatively inefficient due to the differences in their production technologies and 
technological dynamics. In other words, these findings may be industry-specific. 
Received: November 30, 1997 
Table 1 
Parameter Estimates - Linear Terms 
aO 0.1202 0.0119 d E3 -0.0223 0.0349 
al -0.0361 0.0103 dE4 0.0212 0.0922 
a2 -0.0154 0.0358 dALO -0.0257 0.0118 
a3 -0.0374 0.0188 dALl 0.0036 0.0034 
a4 -0.0465 0.0151 dAL2 0.0329 0.0386 
bKO 0.2857 0.0077 dAL3 -0.0002 0.0083 
bKl -0.0214 0.0067 dAL4 -0.0060 0.0067 
bK2 -0.0184 0.0099 dcoo 0.0337 0.0101 
bK3 -0.02\0 0.0126 dCOl -0.0043 0.0021 
bK4 -0.0324 0.0095 dC02 -0.0150 0.0156 
bMO 0.3693 0.0047 dC03 -0.0099 0.0083 
bMl 0.0258 0.0042 dC04 -0.0056 0.0036 
bM2 0.0204 0.0059 fKl 0.2432 0.1043 
bM3 0.0182 0.0089 fK2 0.367 0.1594 
bM4 0.0205 0.0075 fK3 -0.2172 0.1283 
CACO 0.0712 0.0189 fK4 -0.1921 0.0781 
CACI -0.0314 0.0067 fMl -0.3673 0.0417 
cAC2 -0.0031 0.0112 fM2 -0.0366 0.0647 
CAC3 -0.0084 0.0260 fM3 -0.3352 0.0859 
cAC4 -0.0371 0.0147 fM4 -0.2519 0.0837 
cuo 0.8828 0.0236 71 0.0033 0.0117 
cUI 0.0421 0.0083 72 -0.0287 0.0108 
cU2 0.0189 0.0205 73 -0.0263 0.0119 
cU3 0.0208 0.0241 74 -0.0371 0.0123 
cU4 0.0439 0.0148 75 -0.0335 0.0123 
dEO -0.3724 0.0774 76 -0.0398 0.0127 
d E 1 0.0059 0.0398 77 -0.0500 0.0131 
d E2 0.1630 0.1780 
Note: K=capital, L=labor, M=materials, AC=access lines, U=usage, E=electronic switches, 
CO=central office, AL=average loop length. Numerical figures are used to index both regulatory 
dummies and annual dummies. 
Table 2 
Parameter Estimates - Second-order Terms 
eLL 0.1824 0.0037 WU4 -0.0302 0.0096 
eKK 0.2285 0.0015 WU5 -0.0371 0.0097 
eLK -0.1131 0.0021 WU6 -0.0279 0.0102 
ALAC 0.0232 0.0093 WU7 -0.024 0.0103 
AKAC -0.0075 0.0059 WACI 0.0242 0.0077 
ALU -0.0447 0.0109 WAC2 0.0354 0.0092 
AKU 0.0211 0.0068 WAC3 0.0354 0.0106 
/LLE -0.2405 0.0485 WAC4 0.0343 0.0112 
/LKE 0.1108 0.029 WAC5 0.0448 0.0116 
/LLCO 0.0147 0.0046 WAC6 0.0356 0.0117 
/LKCO -0.0096 0.0029 WAC7 0.0326 0.0117 
/LLAL -0.0114 0.006 KEE -0.4397 0.2264 
/LKAL 0.0074 0.0037 KECO 0.0493 0.0297 
PLI 0.0042 0.0075 KEAL 0.0176 0.0318 
PL2 -0.0181 0.0068 KCOCO -0.0126 0.0033 
PL3 -0.0185 0.0078 KCOAL 0.0115 0.0041 
PL4 -0.0281 0.0082 KALAL -0.0087 0.0049 
PL5 -0.0277 0.0082 WEI 0.0265 0.023 
PL6 -0.0328 0.0083 WE2 0.0449 0.032 
PL7' -0.0439 0.0086 WE3 0.0932 0.0411 
PKI 0.0004 0.0047 WE4 0.0688 0.0423 
PK2 0.0126 0.0045 WE5 0.0604 0.0493 
PK3 0.0123 0.0049 WE6 0.1004 0.0564 
PK4 0.0176 0.0051 WE7 0.1275 0.0669 
PK5 0.0165 0.0051 WCOI -0.0027 0.0048 
PK6 0.0213 0.0052 WC02 -0.0069 0.0052 
PK7 0.0246 0.0054 WC03 -0.0023 0.0061 
qju 
-0.1097 0.019 WC04 -0.004 0.0063 
[UAC 0.1208 0.0195 WC05 -0.0073 0.0066 
[ACAC -0.1377 0.022 WC06 -0.0075 0.0066 
VUE 0.3407 0.0456 WC07 -0.005 0.0066 
VACE -0.3572 0.061 WALl -0.0009 0.0039 
VUCO -0.0215 0.006 WAL2 0.0002 0.0043 
VUAL 0.0296 0.0107 WAL3 0.0005 0.0049 
VACCO 0.0312 0.0075 WAL4 0.0007 0.0053 
VACAL -0.0407 0.0124 WAL5 0.0068 0.0057 
WUI -0.0218 0.0071 WAL6 0.0099 0.0058 
WU2 -0.0292 0.0086 WAL7 0.011 0.0061 
'fIU3 -0.0324 0.0093 
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Table 3 
Results of Technical Efficiency Tests 
al =a2=a3=a4=0 14.1713 
bKl =bK2=bK3 =bK4=0 13.8763 
bMl =bM2=bM3 =bM4=0 30.5130 
bKl=bK2=bK3=bK4=bMl=bM2=bM3=bM4=0 36.4506 
CKl=CK2=CK3=CK4=0 26.0761 
CMl=CM2=CM3=CM4=0 26.1677 
CKl=CK2=CK3=CK4=CMl=CM2=CM3=CM4=0 40.1695 
dTl =dT2=dT3 =dT4=0 3.3689 
dCl=dc2=dc3 =dc4=0 11.4509 
dAl=dA2=dA3=dA4=0 5.3162 
dTl =dT2=dT3=dT4=dAl =dA2=dA3 =dA4=0 11.9697 
Table 4 
Results of Allocative Efficiency Tests 
rKl=rK2=rK3=rK4=0 
rMl=rM2=rM3=rM4=0 
rKl=rMl 
rK2=rM2 
rK3=rM3 
rK4=rM4 
rKO=rMO=0.95 
rKU=rMO=0.90 
rKO=rMO=0.80 
rKO=rMO=0.70 
rKo=0.36, rMo=0.65* 
rKo=O. 70, rMo=0.91 * 
rKo=0.81, rMo=0.89* 
Table 5 
Experiment Results 
7.5527 
15.2428 
30.7504 
46.2104 
210.3817 
59.9374 
29.7310 
11.7271 
34.3361 
18.6458 
3.9669 
2.0253 
0.5580 
0.0067 
0.0077 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.4981 
0.0219 
0.2564 
0.1526 
0.0195 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0464 
0.1546 
0.4550 
0.0229 
0.0005 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
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